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Sponsor Statement by NOW: Pensions
NOW: Pensions commissioned this report from the Pensions Institute at Cass 
Business School because we believed it would highlight some of the problems 
which UK employers will face in providing their employees with a good 
retirement income from auto-enrolment − and would make recommendations 
on how to overcome these problems. We believe this report offers a step-
changing approach for UK pensions, and, if the recommendations are taken up, 
should lead to better retirement prospects for all employees.
For too long many UK employees have suffered from high-charging pension 
schemes with choices (and charges) that are difficult to understand and which 
do not deliver what members expect. Auto-enrolment has arrived, and this 
means that every employer in the UK will have to offer a pension – and every 
employee will be automatically enrolled in the scheme of their employers’ choice 
over the next 5½ years. Employees should therefore be able to look forward to 
a more comfortable retirement. They should be able to contribute (and see their 
employer contributing) safe in the knowledge that they will get a pension which 
is good value for money and does not suffer from undue uncertainty.
However, the findings of the report demonstrate it is not as simple as that. 
There still exist many pension schemes which, whilst compliant with the new 
auto-enrolment regulations, are not truly fit for purpose today. They have high 
charges and the investments are too volatile. In short, they stand little chance of 
delivering a satisfactory pension.
The good news is that this could change, if the findings of this report are taken 
seriously, and the recommendations are acted upon.
The report shows that the level of charges is a key factor in the long-term 
performance of an employee’s pension entitlement. It finds that, whilst the 
employee is ultimately the customer, it is the employer who chooses the pension 
arrangement and hence is the buyer – so the philosophy of “caveat emptor” 
(buyer beware) will not work. The onus should be on the seller, or the scheme 
provider – to take responsibility for ensuring that the scheme delivers. 
As part of this, NOW: Pensions supports the recommendation of this report 
that schemes which meet high standards in respect of charges, investment of 
default funds and governance should be able to qualify for a kitemark, so that 
employers, on whose shoulders it falls to select a scheme for their workforce, 
can select a scheme with a kite mark with the comfort that they are selecting 
what should be a good quality arrangement – and be shielded from any future 
accusations that they did not exercise due diligence in selecting a scheme. 
It will also give employees confidence that their employers have chosen an 
appropriate pension scheme for their needs.
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Importantly, the report recommends that employers should take the opportunity 
of the new pension environment to review their current scheme, in light of the 
enormous impact that charges have on performance.
Pensions should do what they say on the tin – provide a lifetime income in 
retirement that is fair value relative to the contributions paid. We believe the 
recommendations set out here should be studied by consumer and employee 
representatives, employers, government and pension providers, in order to 
ensure that those whom pensions are set up to serve – the customers – actually 
get the pension they deserve.
We would welcome discussions with our competitors and other interested 
parties, and look forward with interest to hearing reactions to this excellent 
report.
Chris Daykin, 
Trustee Director, NOW: Pension Trustee Ltd, UK Government Actuary (1989-2007) 
Morten Nilsson,
Chief Executive, NOW: Pensions
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Foreword
The Pensions Act 2008 introduced a requirement for private sector employers to 
auto-enrol all qualifying employees into a workplace pension scheme. With the 
demise of defined benefit (DB) schemes, employers will use contract- and trust-
based defined contribution (DC) schemes for this purpose. 
Auto-enrolment began in October 2012 with the biggest employers and 
concludes in 2018 with the smallest. A key regulatory requirement is that 
qualifying schemes must provide a default investment fund. This is because 
schemes cannot insist that auto-enrolees make an investment choice, since they 
have not actively chosen to join the scheme in the first place. There is also a 
requirement that there should be no advisor or consultant charge deducted from 
members’ funds where only the minimum contribution is paid.
Auto-enrolment is a hugely ambitious experiment on the part of the UK 
government. Its objective is to ensure that all private sector employees – with the 
exception of the very low earners – build up a private pension to supplement 
the state pension. While the government sets the rules and regulations for auto-
enrolment (policy), it is wholly dependent on private sector providers and advisors 
for the supply and distribution of schemes via employers to employees (delivery). 
The introduction of auto-enrolment coincides with the introduction in January 
2013 of the retail distribution review (RDR), which bans sales commission on 
new schemes sold from 1 January 2013. As the report explains, the unintended 
consequence of these two new regimes is an advice gap in the smaller employer 
market, which – unless addressed – is likely to lead to member detriment.
This report analyses the DC default funds used for auto-enrolment from two main 
perspectives. The first is qualitative and considers the impact of the behavioural 
traits of sellers (the providers, consultants and advisors that determine the fund 
design and the supply and distribution chain) and buyers (employers and trustees 
on behalf of the employees auto-enrolled). The second is a quantitative analysis 
of the impact of charges and asset allocations on the size of pension outcomes 
in different default funds. A number of existing and new schemes are modelled 
using appropriately calibrated stochastic simulation models. 
There are about 205,000 DC schemes in the private sector: 160,000 of these 
are contract-based and 45,000 are trust-based. In aggregate, only 10,000 – 
approximately 5% – have more than 100 members. According to the market 
analyst Spence Johnson, these smaller schemes account for 40% of assets.1 
This fact alone tells us that most schemes are too small to be efficient, while 
recent research from the National Association of Pensions Funds (NAPF) and the 
multi-employer scheme provider B&CE tells us that many smaller employers are 
not even aware of the charges members bear, which raises important questions 
about the clarity of the disclosure of charges at the point of sale.2 
1 For DC market analysis see Spence Johnson’s ‘Broad Brush’ reports, in particular  
numbers 7 and 10: www.spencejohnson.com/TheBroadBrush.html 
2 www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0261-Telling-Employers-about-DC- 
Pension-Charges-Research-Conducted-by-IFF-for-NAPF-and-BandCE.aspx
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Until the arrival of modern ‘multi-employer’ schemes – by which we mean 
schemes that are available to all employers  irrespective of size and membership 
profile – members  in smaller schemes generally have paid up to six times (if not 
more) the  annual charge that applies  to those in the largest schemes, which 
makes the member outcome a lottery.
The results of our quantitative modelling demonstrate that charges are the most 
important determinant of the size of the final pension. Conventional wisdom in 
the DC market suggests that you get what you pay for: that higher charges are 
rewarded by better investment performance. In general, this is simply not true. 
While there might be a very small number of specialist fund managers who 
deliver above-average performance for a limited period, they are unlikely to be 
managing the assets of employees with lower and median  incomes – the target 
market for auto-enrolment.3  
Data on workplace DC schemes are unreliable.  In a trust-based scheme, leavers 
are formally categorised as deferred members and therefore remain with the 
scheme and are captured within scheme membership data. 
By contrast members who leave a contract-based scheme are re-categorised 
as individual personal pension customers. We were told that about 80% of job 
changers do not transfer their previous pots to their new workplace scheme 
and in the case of contract-based scheme members there is no audit trail that 
facilitates tracking the charges they pay as ‘retail’ customers, even though we 
know that in many cases ‘deferred’ charges applied to these customers are as 
much as twice the level of charges for ‘active’ members (those still working for 
the employer that provides the scheme).
In 2012, the DC workplace market is valued at £386bn.4 Estimates indicate that 
the total number of active and deferred members of workplace DC schemes 
is between 3m to 5m. We do not know for sure, but we believe that this large 
variation in estimates is due to the reclassification of ‘deferred’ memberships of 
contract-based schemes as retail customers.
An estimated 10m employees will be auto-enrolled into workplace pension 
schemes over the next six years. Some will opt out.  The government expects 
about 20% to do so; the industry suggests this figure might be much higher.5 
Given this uncertainty we suggest that by 2018 total membership might be in 
the region of 11-13m. The Pensions Regulator (tPR) expects this massive influx to 
increase aggregate contributions to DC by £9bn per annum, although alternative 
sources put the figure much lower.6 
3 For evidence of this in the context of UK pension fund investment, see both Blake, D,  
Lehmann, B, and Timmermann, A. (1999), ‘Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund 
Performance’, Journal of Business, 72, 429-61 and Blake, D., Rossi, A., Timmermann, A., Tonks, I., 
Wermers, R. (forthcoming), ‘Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund 
Industry’, Journal of Finance.
4 Sources: Spence Johnson and ONS
5 According to the NAPF’s ‘Workplace Pensions Survey’, March 2012, up to 33% might drop out. 
www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0220_NAPF_workplace_pensions_survey_-_
March_2012.aspx
6 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/delivering-successful-automatic-enrolment.pdf
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The workplace DC market is already heavily subsidised by government tax 
incentives, paid for by the taxpayer, and worth about £8.5bn in 2010-11.7 
Auto-enrolment will boost DC assets under management significantly and 
therefore in theory represents an extraordinary business opportunity for private 
sector providers and advisors. But they have not embraced this opportunity 
wholesale. Due to targeting (by employers, consultants, advisors and providers), 
under the system of voluntary participation that preceded auto-enrolment, 
scheme members tended to be above-average earners and longer-stayers. 
This meant that they paid higher than average contributions and were likely 
to continue making contributions due to a more established career structure. 
These characteristics made the voluntary market very profitable for all parties 
concerned in the provider and advisory markets. Auto-enrolled memberships 
will reflect the working population as a whole, which, in the industry’s own 
terminology, risks ‘polluting’ profitable schemes. 
Employers that do not have access to advice, because their economic and 
demographic profile is ‘polluted’, fall into two categories. The first can be 
described as a ‘greenfield’ site, in that there is no scheme at present (other than 
an empty stakeholder box). It is to be hoped these employers will find their way 
to the low-cost multi-employer schemes, but they will need clear signposts. The 
second is a ‘brownfield’ employer which is likely to have been sold a contract-
based scheme in the 1990s or early 2000s, with a total member charge of 2-3% 
of assets under management. Unless these employers are told otherwise, they 
will use their existing schemes for auto-enrolment. If this happens, millions of 
members will suffer detriment. We argue that this problem can be prevented if 
the government, regulators and industry act now.
It is frequently said in financial circles that the main problem with DC is low 
contributions, not high charges. We fully endorse the argument that people must 
save more to provide for their pensions, but the issue of charges should be sorted 
out first; otherwise, we are asking employers and employees to ‘buy blind’ and 
waste precious financial resources. 
We would like to thank the many organisations and individuals who helped 
with this research. Those who were happy to be mentioned are noted in the 
acknowledgements.
We would particularly like to thank Now: Pensions for sponsoring this report.  
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those 
of Now: Pensions or the Pensions Institute which takes no policy positions. Now: 
Pensions did not seek to influence our views in any way.
Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd, October 2012
7 ‘Estimated tax relief for employer sponsored, private sector defined contribution pension schemes, 
in 2010-11’, in NAO, Regulating Defined Contribution Pension Schemes www.nao.org.uk/
publications/1213/defined_contribution_pensions.aspx
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Findings
1.  Our investigation of pension providers, consultants and advisors reveals a 
dysfunctional market that can lead to severe member detriment, especially 
for employees in smaller companies.  
2.  Data on workplace DC schemes are unreliable because contract-based 
providers recategorise scheme leavers as retail customers - this is, they are 
no longer part of the scheme. This makes it impossible to analyse what 
happens to ‘deferred’ member charges.
3.  Thousands of employees pay six times the annual charge that is available 
from the modern multi-employer schemes – a total expense ratio (TER) of up 
to 3% p.a., or even more, compared with a long-term TER of 0.5% or less for 
these new schemes.
4.  For a number of providers, there is a lack of clarity over charges and what 
precisely is included in the TER. Our research encountered examples of 
what can only be at best described as ‘disingenuous practices’ in respect of 
charge and cost disclosure on the part of some providers and advisors. These 
unfairly distort competition and strongly influence the ‘choice’ of schemes 
employers purchase.  
5.  Our findings from the quantitative analysis show that the retirement incomes 
of these in the high-charging schemes will be worth only about an average of 
50% of the income achieved by members in low-charging schemes after 40 
years of membership. 
6.  Our quantitative analysis also showed the default funds used for auto-
enrolment had very different risk and return profiles, with the highest-risk 
funds producing around 50% of the retirement income produced by the 
lowest-risk funds in the worst-case scenarios that we modelled, according to 
the downside risk measure we used.
7.  High charges are disguised by massive complexity, but also by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) projection rates, which are unrealistically optimistic 
relative to performance post-2000 and are likely to remain so even when 
revised. 
8.  Unless older high-charging schemes are abolished, their use for  
auto-enrolment – when up to 10m low- to median-earners often with low 
financial literacy join DC schemes – will lead to the UK pensions market 
facing a mis-selling scandal on an unprecedented scale.
9.  The long-term TERs of 0.5% or less for new schemes are the charges that 
members will pay if they remain in the scheme for a long period of time (at 
least 7-15 years). If they only stay for a short period, the effective charges 
they will pay will be much higher in schemes with a dual charging structure 
(e.g., in the case where the scheme has a charge on both contributions/
administration and assets under management).
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10.  The extent of vested interest as well as the embedded behaviour or conduct 
of market participants suggests that the market will not reform itself in 
relation to older contract-based fund charges.
11.  Charges are not regulated by the FSA or the Pensions Regulator (tPR); 
charges do not appear to form part of the qualifying scheme compliance 
process.
12.  Advice to employers is not regulated by the FSA and tPR. This is a massive 
oversight on the part of the regulatory system. 
a.   Caveat emptor and the FSA’s ‘treating customers fairly’ (TCF) regime assume 
that buyers understand the cost of their purchases. This is not the case, 
especially for smaller employers. 
b.   Auto-enrolees are the customers but they are not the buyers because they 
are auto-enrolled into a scheme bought by an employer that might not 
understand the impact of charges. Auto-enrolees, therefore, are ‘buying 
blind’.
13.  Large employers with professional advice have the scale and negotiating 
power to drive down charges. The same is true of the new trust-based multi-
employer schemes. Smaller employers are disadvantaged by the supply and 
distribution system:
a.   Those with high staff turnover and a significant proportion of lower earners 
do not have access to professional advice. They are perceived as unprofitable 
(‘polluted’ in the industry’s language) by most advisors and life offices. 
b.   If these employers happen to find their way to one of the new low-cost  
multi-employer schemes, members are likely to end up with a bigger pension 
relative to contributions compared with employees in existing high-charging 
life office funds.
c   However, there is no automatic default position for these employers  
that directs them to the most appropriate schemes. Under the original 
blueprint for auto-enrolment, this would have been the government-
sponsored National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), but industry  
pressure stopped this. 
 
14.  Even where employees are auto-enrolled into a low-charging scheme for 
future service, their older pension assets will continue to languish in high-
charging funds due to a dysfunctional transfer market for contract-based 
schemes. 
a.   Exit charges act as a massive barrier to transfers, which means that members 
are trapped and frequently pay even higher charges when they stop 
contributions.
b.   ‘Schemes’ are in fact a series of individual contracts. This means that every 
member has to sign a transfer form – an extensive exercise that requires 
considerable communication and information resources, which smaller 
employers in particular do not have. 
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Recommendations
1. Caveat venditor
a.  Caveat venditor – let the seller beware – represents a more appropriate 
principle than caveat emptor – let the buyer beware – for members of auto-
enrolment DC default funds and should be the overarching framework for 
auto-enrolment. 
b.   This requires robust governance frameworks that embed a fiduciary duty to 
put members’ interests first. 
c.   Caveat venditor should apply to all schemes irrespective of whether they 
are trust- or contract-based and whether they are run by providers with 
shareholders or not-for-profit organisations.
2.  There should be a commonly agreed definition of the total expense  
ratio (TER) (or ongoing charge as it will be known in future). 
The TER should include:
•	 	annual	management	charge	(AMC)	by	the	investment	manager
•	 	additional	fund	expenses	in	relation	to	specific	delegated	charges	not	
covered by the AMC (e.g., custodian fees; fund administration fees; 
accounting and auditing fees; valuation fees; distribution fees; legal and 
regulatory fees; directors’ and advisors’ fees)
•	 	all	costs	relating	to	scheme	administration	and	member	record	keeping,	
whether these be expressed as a monetary or a percentage figure. 
•	 	advice	to	the	employer	or	trustee,	where	this	forms	part	of	the	member	charge
Any separate advisory fees invoiced by the consultant, but paid for by the 
employer/trustees rather than the member should be excluded from the TER 
calculation, because it is too difficult to assess whether the member is being 
impacted by these fees (for instance via a lower employer contribution rate).
3. The high charges on legacy default funds should be eliminated
The high charges imposed by the older default funds which started in the 1990s 
or earlier should be eliminated voluntarily or via regulation.   
a.  The starting point for the Pensions Regulator would be to reject, for scheme 
qualification purposes, any scheme that has high long-term charges relative 
to those offered by the new trust-based multi-employer schemes which have 
an annual long-term TER of 0.5% or less. 
b.  The same point applies to default funds that impose exit charges, as this 
undermines the portability of member funds and therefore does not reflect 
the needs of the modern workforce.
c.  The government and regulators urgently need to consider the solution to 
member assets trapped in these older schemes due to exit penalties.
d.  They also need to consider changing the remit of regulators so that they can 
regulate charges explicitly.
4. A ‘scheme’ should be a ‘scheme’, not a series of individual contracts
a.  The reclassification of contract-based workplace arrangements as ‘schemes’ 
would facilitate bulk transfers of members’ assets to lower-cost schemes. 
b.  This would also make workplace DC market data more transparent and 
therefore subject to greater scrutiny. 
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5.   A kite mark should be introduced for schemes that serve the ‘direct-to-
employer’ market  and to accommodate ‘refugees’ from older high-
charging schemes
a.  The current (long-term) TER of 0.5% or less, established by modern multi-
employer schemes, would seem to be an appropriate target for the auto-
enrolment market as a whole. 
b.  This target should form the basis for a kite mark for schemes that have good 
investment governance built in, and which can be purchased by employers 
directly, without the need for advice, which adds to member costs and in the 
case of smaller employers might not be available. 
c.  Kite-marked schemes should be available via a central website.
d.  They should be promoted as the natural home for smaller employers in 
particular that are new to the market, and used for transfers for employers 
with older high-charging schemes.
6. Regulatory Reform 
The current dual system of regulation whereby the Pensions Regulator regulates trust-
based schemes and the FSA regulates contract-based schemes should be reformed. 
7.  Advisors to employers should be regulated in the same way as advisors  
to individuals
a.  In order to close a loophole that leads to member detriment, the FSA – and, 
from 2013, the new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – should regulate 
advice to employers in the same way in which they regulate advice to 
individuals. Employers – particularly in the smaller company market – cannot 
be regarded as informed institutional purchasers and their decisions can 
result in unacceptably high charges for their employees.
b.  To improve their ability to regulate ‘conduct’ more effectively, the FSA and 
FCA need to have a much better understanding of the behavioural traits – 
identified by us in this report –  exhibited by the industry they regulate.  
8. Projection rates should be credible
a.  When the FSA revises its projection rates for DC and other long-term investments, 
these should be credible and not give the false impression that members can 
expect a fixed return of 8% (or whatever the new projection rate is).
b. Triennial reviews would help to ensure projections remain on track. 
9. Projections should be presented in a way that is meaningful to members
Projected outcomes for DC default funds should be presented in a way that 
is meaningful to members, such as in the form of a projected real income in 
retirement or a replacement ratio, rather than in the form of a projected return 
on the fund or a projected fund size at retirement.  
10. A measure of downside risk should be presented
Alongside a projected performance measure such as the projected real income in 
retirement or the replacement ratio, DC default funds should report a downside 
risk measure
11. The quality of data about the workplace DC market should be improved
There needs to be considerably more high quality data made publicly available 
about the workplace DC market.
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1 How The DC Scheme Market Works: A Qualitative  
Evaluation Of The Behavioural Traits Of Sellers And Buyers
The new market for auto-enrolment began on 1 October 2012. Employees 
who are not in a workplace pension scheme will be auto-enrolled into a 
defined contribution (DC) pension scheme established by their employer. In 
this section, we describe how the current DC scheme market works in practice, 
using a combination of analysis of publicly available information, investigation 
of regulatory regimes, and anonymised interviews with industry participants. 
This allows us to shed light on how the market works in practice. Of particular 
importance are the behavioural traits of both those selling into the market 
and those buying from the market. Our findings here will help to inform the 
recommendations we make in Section 3 of the report. We begin by explaining 
‘what is auto-enrolment?’
1.1 What is auto-enrolment?
The Pensions Act 2008 introduced new pension duties for private sector 
employers. Starting with the largest employers in 2012 and ending with the 
smallest in 2018, the Act requires employers to automatically enrol qualifying 
employees over the age of 22 into a designated pension scheme. The date at 
which the new duties take effect will depend on the size of the employer’s pay-as-
you-earn (PAYE) scheme.1
The policy aim of auto-enrolment is to ensure that employees build adequate 
private pension provision. By 2018, there will be more than 1m new employers 
providing pension schemes. Up to 10m new employees will be auto-enrolled, 
but they have the right to opt out. However, if they do so, they will be re-enrolled 
every three years. Employers are not permitted to offer inducements to encourage 
employees to opt out.
Auto-enrolment applies to workers (‘eligible jobholders’) who:
•	 Are	not	already	in	a	qualifying	workplace	pension	scheme;
•	 Are	at	least	22	years	old;
•	 Are	below	state	pension	age;
•	 Earn	more	than	£8,105	a	year;	and
•	 Work	or	ordinarily	work	in	the	UK	(under	their	contract)	
The rules require total minimum contributions of 8% based on earnings between 
£5,564 and £42,475 (‘qualifying earnings’) in the 2012/13 tax year. This 8% 
total comprises a contribution of 3% from the employer, 4% from employees and 
1% tax relief.2 Employers can choose to set higher minimum contribution levels.
Almost without exception, auto-enrolment schemes will be DC, which means that 
members will bear the investment and longevity risks and, in most cases, the 
total costs associated with asset management, the delivery ‘platform’, the advice 
to the employer or trustee (if there is one), and the administrative costs. These 
1 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/employers/staging-date-timeline.aspx 
2 The contribution requirements will be phased in starting with a minimum of 2% of qualifying 
earnings, of which the employer must pay a minimum of 1%.
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schemes can either be trust-based (run by a board of trustees) or contract-based 
(run by a provider such as an insurance company). Employers can use a new 
scheme specifically set up for the auto-enrolment regime or they can use one of 
the existing schemes  that have been in place since the introduction of personal 
pensions in the late 1980s. 
To qualify for regulatory approval – a process overseen by the Pensions 
Regulator3 – an auto-enrolled scheme must provide a default investment fund 
to accommodate the majority of members who do not want to make investment 
decisions. In aggregate, an estimated 90-97% of members will use the default 
fund and in some cases the figure will be 100%.4
1.2 Who is the customer?
An important question for the regulators is ‘who exactly is the customer?’. This 
question is particularly important in the case of contract-based schemes, where 
the contract is between the member and the provider. Here the employer is the 
buyer, but not the customer; the member is the customer, but not the buyer, 
and therefore has no influence over the choice of scheme to which he or she is 
passively auto-enrolled. 
The employer has no responsibility for member outcomes, in law or in 
regulation. By contrast, in a trust-based scheme, the contract is between the 
trustees and the provider, and the trustees’ primary role is to undertake a legal 
and regulatory duty to put members’ interests above all other considerations 
(although it is important to note that in practice the expertise of trustees varies 
considerably).5 
Under a contract-based arrangement, the employer might take advice, but the 
advice is not regulated. This is despite the very low levels of employer knowledge 
and understanding, as revealed in ‘Telling employers about DC pension 
charges’, published in September 2012 by the NAPF and B&CE.
The cost of advice – agreed by the employer with the advisor – typically is 
passed on to the member, even though the member generally has no say in this 
agreement and no contact with the advisory firm. This cost, which might take 
the form of an upfront fee or commission plus annual ‘trail’ fees/commissions 
(paid annually from year two of the contract), is deducted by the provider from 
the member’s assets and usually lasts for the lifetime of the contract. One 
interviewee described this process, from an advisor-remuneration perspective,  
as ‘commission without permission’. 6
3 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/employers/explaining-qualifying-schemes.aspx 
4 This is the figure common in other countries with auto-enrolment, such as Sweden.
5 In a trust-based scheme, members effectively have their own accounts – so although legally, trust 
and contract are different, from an administration and accounting perspective, they operate in the 
same way in that all members have their own designated pots.
6 Commission will not be permitted for sales of new schemes with effect from 1 January 2013.  
Existing arrangements will be able to continue to operate on a commission basis. Moreover, new fee 
arrangements in many cases appear to mirror commission rates.
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A minority of financially sophisticated scheme members might examine the 
scheme charges and decide they are excessive. Under auto-enrolment, they 
have the right to opt out of the company scheme and to buy personal pensions 
instead. However, in this case, the employer contribution almost certainly 
would be lost, since it is under no obligation to pay contributions to alternative 
arrangements established by opt-outs. 
1.3 The supply and distribution chain
The government is heavily dependent for the delivery of auto-enrolment on an 
industry where powerful vested interests shape behaviour (‘conduct’ in regulatory 
terms) in the supply and distribution chain. Due to fierce competition in the  
auto-enrolment market, new schemes generally offer better value for money 
than the older schemes.7 However, vested interests  - and also the challenges of 
revising contract law retrospectively - present major challenges for the reform 
of the tens of thousands of older schemes that are still likely to be used for 
auto-enrolment and which have high charges relative to what seems to be an 
achievable long-run target TER of 0.5% or less established by schemes that are 
open to all employers. 
The employer’s or trustees’ ‘choice’ of scheme and fund is dictated by the 
idiosyncrasies of the supply and distribution chain in the DC market, which, 
until the advent of the new multi-employer schemes, was determined by the 
demographic and economic profile of the potential membership. It so happens 
that the highest charges have fallen on scheme memberships characterised by 
lower-earners and high staff turnover. 
In our 2004 report,8 we said that most advisors and providers had withdrawn 
from companies with fewer than 50-100 employees, due to the negligible profit 
margins. Where an employer was considered economically marginal, advisors 
and providers imposed an above-average member charge to compensate for 
lower contributions and higher lapse rates due to staff turnover.
Under auto-enrolment, these considerations apply but in slightly different ways. 
Interviewees said that large firms of advisors and the major life offices still do 
not want the unprofitable sections of employees because, we were told, these 
memberships would ‘pollute’ profitable schemes. To avoid these, they cherry 
pick: they separate out the profitable memberships for themselves and place the 
‘polluted’ sections in a multi-employer scheme designed for the mass market. A 
consultant explained to us: ‘for the polluted section of a workforce, our job is not 
to provide a pension, but to administer auto-enrolment requirements. There is no 
embedded value in this section of the market’. 
It will be very interesting to see the results of these cherry-picking exercises in  
due course, when it will be possible to compare the outcomes of members in  
7 In June 2012, the stated average life office annual management charge (AMC) for new business 
was in the range 0.5-0.7% for active members, but this does not include the cost of advice. The 
lowest TER we discovered for contract-based schemes sold through an advisor in 2012 was 1%.  
www.abi.org.uk/Publications/62708.pdf
8 www.pensions-institute.org/reports/deliveringDC.pdf
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the contract-based life office funds and in the trust-based multi-employer funds.  
Our quantitative modelling results, presented in Section 2, indicate that the  
latter will get better value – in some cases significantly so – relative to 
contributions paid.
Auto-enrolment rules do not allow the advisor to deduct a charge from member 
funds where only the minimum contribution of 8% is paid. We were told that 
many employers will not pay an advisor fee, which means that in effect their 
employees will be disenfranchised from the scheme advisory market. In the 
absence of advice, employers that already have a scheme are likely to continue 
to use this for auto-enrolment.
In theory, local and regional independent financial advisors (IFAs) might cater 
for smaller employers, but we understand that their expertise is largely in the 
retail market and that they are unlikely to have the expertise in workplace auto-
enrolment schemes. Moreover, under the Retail Distribution Review (RDR),9  it 
will be more difficult for IFAs to secure the remuneration they need through 
explicit fees. The FSA makes this point on its website, somewhat ironically under 
‘Treating Customers Fairly’ (TCF): ‘firms are looking to move into a phase of 
growing revenue by attracting profitable customers and reducing unprofitable 
customers’.10 
Consultants and advisors
Fee-based consultants and commission-based corporate advisors have both 
played an important role in the development of the workplace DC market. 
Historically, this market was dominated by the commission-based corporate 
advisors which sold contract-based and bundled trust-based DC schemes to 
smaller and medium-sized employers that did not want the cost and complexity 
of DB. From the turn of the century, when medium-sized and larger employers 
began to close their DB schemes, fee-based consultants became more involved 
in the market and sold DC to their corporate clients for members’ future accrual.
We understand that today these two categories of advisor are difficult to 
distinguish when it comes to DC business. Some fee-based consultants charge 
commission (they might call it a ‘fee’, but in practice this is just a ‘professional’ 
way of restating the commission payment), while corporate advisors are moving  
to a fee basis in advance of RDR. Some corporate advisors have re-branded 
explicitly as ‘consultants’.
Although corporate advisors and most consultants are FSA-regulated, such 
regulation does not extend to advice to employers. The FSA said that to address 
this oversight in regulation would require a change in its regulatory scope and 
this, in turn, ‘would be a matter for the Treasury as the sponsoring government 
department’.
9 www.fsa.gov.uk/rdr 
10 www.fsa.gov.uk/doing/regulated/tcf
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Consultant-providers
Certain consultants have entered the DC market as scheme providers, whereby 
they construct their own scheme using one or more asset managers for the 
default fund and one or more life offices for the platform. 
This development has proved to be very controversial because, as independent 
firms, consultants are assumed to advise and recommend schemes based on the 
whole of the market. 
It is not clear if consultant-providers act in this capacity as discretionary asset 
managers, restricted-advice IFAs, or both, but in practice the difference between 
‘independent’ and ‘restricted’ in these cases appears to be blurred, as is the 
boundary between ‘consultant’, ‘provider’ and ‘asset manager’. 
Interviewees said consultants are taking this step in order to retain their fee-
earning role as default fund designers, which is lost if the asset manager or 
multi-employer scheme undertakes this role. They also said that the consultant-
provider model creates market distortions in the employer’s ‘choice’ where the 
consultant charged with selecting a scheme on an independent basis is also able 
to offer its own product.  
This is a clear conflict of interest. If a consultant has its own product, it is effectively 
offering tied or restricted advice under RDR, so how can they claim to give 
independent advice? Asset manager
1.4 Charges
The next important issue to consider is the way that member charges are 
calculated and the amount that is paid to the various parties to a scheme’s 
design and delivery, including the consultants and advisors. Remuneration to 
consultants and advisors can be a very significant element of the overall member 
charge. This is particularly relevant in the light of the FSA’s damning statement 
on sales bias, which is a result of the incentive systems employed by the firms it 
regulates.11 
We recognise that in many cases consultants and advisors do an excellent job for 
the employers they advise, but this is not always so, according to interviewees:
When you look at the true cost of DC, you find that the consultant and advisor 
costs are equal to the asset management and platform costs combined. With good 
governance as part of the product, there’s no need for a lot of advisors in the DC 
market; employers and employees would be better off – literally – without them. 
Asset manager
We suggest that the rationale for high consultant and advisor charges should 
be re-evaluated. The old argument that was offered in the 1990s was that in a 
voluntary market, where many people did not appreciate the importance of private 
retirement savings, pensions had to be ‘sold’. Providers, therefore, argued that they 
had to pay attractive commission rates to the intermediaries who undertook the job 
11 www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0905-mw.shtml 
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of selling to what often was considered a tough and unwilling buyer.
Under auto-enrolment, this rationale no longer applies because employers 
are required by law to provide a pension scheme and all eligible jobholders 
automatically are ‘buyers’. 
The legacy of complex and high charges
High charges on older pension schemes emerged as the most serious concern 
in this research. Such charges were masked in the 1990s by the high equity 
returns experienced during that decade. They were also masked by the high 
projected investment return of 9%, which the FSA permitted companies to use 
in their illustrations and annual statements – and still does in 2012. The FSA is 
considering revising its projection rate for contract-based pensions to 8%, but this 
still looks high.12  NEST, for example, has a target real (inflation-adjusted) return 
rate of 3%; even this looks optimistic going forward.
Charges for contract-based schemes sold before 2001 are extremely complicated 
and vary from provider to provider.13 A unit-linked fund might have two up-front 
deductions (the ‘allocation rate’ and the initial ‘bid-offer spread’) which together 
could take the equivalent of 7-8% off the value of the units purchased. On-going 
charges include an annual management charge (AMC), which could be 0.75-
1.5% of assets under management (AUM), plus the ‘product management’ fee 
of 0.5-1.5% of AUM for ongoing advice, on top of which there is a monthly 
policy fee of £3-£5. Old-style charges were calculated using the reduction-in-
yield (RIY) methodology, but this did not include the impact of an exit (transfer) 
charge, which might be anything from 5% up to 25% or more, depending on the 
number of years the contract has been in force. Members who reduce or stop 
contributions, but leave their fund with the provider, rather than transfer out, also 
face higher charges. All of these charges are still in force in most older schemes.
Stakeholder schemes, introduced in 2001, initially had an AMC capped at 1%, 
but, after industry lobbying, this was raised in April 2005 to 1.5% for each of the 
first ten years that the contract was in force, after which it reduced to a maximum 
of 1%. Given poor persistency rates – historically most DC contracts lapsed in the 
first five-to-seven years – this means the effective cap from 2005 was 1.5% for 
stakeholder schemes. 
Old charging structures continue in a new guise
Although explicit exit charges are no longer applied to new schemes, many 
providers charge scheme leavers a higher ‘deferred member’ charge, which can 
be double that of the ‘active member’ charge.  Consultants and providers told 
us that employers like this charging structure because ‘it keeps rates low for their 
employees – that is, the active members who matter – at the expense of leavers, 
who do not’. 
Improvements for modern schemes but older schemes remain toxic
We understand that at present there is no regulatory cap for default funds 
12 www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/065.shtml 
13 See www.moneymarketing.co.uk/pensions/nic-cicutti-the-pension-industrys-dirty-little-
secret/1055462.article 
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under auto-enrolment, nor is there any requirement for life offices to apply 
their modern charging structures to their back books, even if these schemes 
continue to be used and will be used for auto-enrolment. When stakeholder 
mono-charging was introduced, some providers said that they had applied the 
new charging structure to certain existing schemes, but clear evidence was not 
produced and interviewees for this research said that old charging structures are 
‘very much alive and kicking today’:
The industry has done a lot in recent years to reduce the level of charges on pensions, 
and modern plans are considerably cheaper and therefore better value than older-style 
arrangements. Unfortunately, many of these old plans are still around and can be 
cripplingly expensive to escape from given the high exit penalties that are built in to 
them. Advisor
Reducing charges would certainly cause problems for the life offices for several 
reasons. One is the sheer complexity of the task. A proportion of 1990s-style 
contracts have been acquired by insurance company aggregators, but a major 
life office with a history of mergers and acquisitions currently might have 20-30 
different charging structures across its DC business. Moreover, it is important to 
note that these high charges also apply to the tens of thousands of small bundled 
trust-based schemes sold in the 1990s, which should be distinguished from the 
generally well-run trust-based schemes of the larger employers.
Probably the most significant reason for not reducing charges on back books 
relates to the frontloading of the costs incurred by life offices, in particular the 
need to recoup the high up-front sales commission to advisors, which often 
accounted for 35% of the members’ contributions in the first year, and to 
maintain the annual ‘trail’ or ongoing commissions agreed at the point of sale. 
In addition there is a huge challenge in attempting to revise contract law 
retrospectively:
We should not underestimate the difficulty of lowering charges for older contract 
schemes. Not only are the terms contractual, but the cash flows presumably support 
the embedded values of the institution. I don’t know how material the sums are, but 
outlawing the charges looks fraught with difficulty. A voluntary offer by companies not 
to take the full charge may be a possibility and perhaps easier for a mutual. Trustee
Therefore the decision for a life office to reduce charges on its older schemes is 
not an easy one, since, in many cases, this could lead to heavy financial losses, 
not just in terms of asset management profits, but also because providers are 
committed through established contracts to advisor commission agreements. 
One interviewee said:
It’s a tough decision for life offices. They might want to clean up older fund charges, 
but if they do, some will go bust. For those that survive, there is a reputational issue 
– customers will ask why they haven’t done this before and could claim compensation. 
The providers’ dilemma is how to move forwards and still to protect the back book. 
The government and the regulators’ dilemma is how to strike a balance between 
treating members of older schemes fairly and avoiding prudential concerns in the 
market. Market analyst
The problem here is that the commission system that operated in the 1990s and 
early 2000s – when life offices ‘bought’ market share in what was described to 
us as a ‘commission war’ – left many financial advisors conflicted and might still 
do so today. 
Caveat Venditor 
Moreover, the commission war has dominated distribution in the run up to 
auto-enrolment. In August 2012, the FSA reported a spike in sales of investment 
products that pay recurring trail commission14 and there has been another 
commission war in advance of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR),15 which 
replaces commission with fees for sales of new schemes after 31 December 2012. 
Importantly, RDR only requires remuneration to be disclosed as fees. It does not 
require fee levels to be reduced, as one interviewee noted:
We share, with many others, concerns about the erosion of pension savings by the cost 
of advice to employers for staff pension schemes – consultancy charging being funded 
from pension savings.  This has, of course, been brought to the fore by auto-enrolment, 
but is a feature of the wider employment-based pensions market.  In the Financial 
Services Authority’s policy statement 10/10, ‘Delivering the Retail Distribution 
Review’, it states that there is no reason why consultancy charges at the level of 
commission currently paid could not be deducted from the first year’s contributions 
to a Group Personal Pension.  A range of 10%-35% is referred to in the policy 
statement.  This is an alarming prospect.  Trust-based multi-employer scheme
In the final quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012, 102,000 and 103,000 
group personal pension schemes (GPPs), respectively, were sold – an increase 
of 13% on the previous period.16 The FSA said that it is unlikely these sales 
represent genuinely new schemes, but rather they are replacements for existing 
schemes. Commission agreements already in place by 31 December 2012 will 
continue  under RDR and will also apply to transfers-in of members’ assets from 
former employer schemes
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has said that it is looking into the extent of exit 
charges in  older funds, while pensions minister Steve Webb has warned insurers that 
their ‘battered’ reputation will be further tarnished unless they tackle the issue:
If people entered a contract 15 years ago on certain terms, unless you can show they 
were misled, it is very difficult for the Government to intervene. However, one might 
have a conversation with the industry and particular providers and ask whether 
certain exit penalties are something they still want to be associated with.17
The government has threatened to use its powers under the 2011 Pensions Act 
to impose a cap on charges for new schemes and it is also considering banning 
deferred member charges. However, its powers do not appear to extend to charges 
for existing schemes and existing deferred members. As we note above, we 
imagine that this is because such an intervention would raise serious issues under 
contract law. Providers recognise the government’s potentially weak position and 
remain extremely reluctant to address charges on older contracts. However, if the 
government did impose a cap going forwards, and if this was incorporated into 
qualifying scheme rules, then at least employers would not be permitted to use 
what might be described as ‘toxic’ schemes for auto-enrolment purposes 
14 www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/psd-retail-investment-2012.pdf
15 www.fsa.gov.uk/rdr 
16 See note 26. 
17  www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/psd-retail-investment-2012.pdf
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1.5 Design complexity
Another feature of the current DC market that emerged in the research is design 
complexity. Interviewees raised concerns about the ways in which providers and 
certain consultants promote overly complex scheme infrastructures. They said 
‘the prime purpose of complex delivery vehicles is to justify a higher consultancy 
commission or fee’. These concerns were also raised in the FairPensions report: 
It may not always be in consultants’ interests to help schemes control costs: on the 
contrary, they may benefit from advising towards complexity, since this increases the 
need for further costly advice … while this has driven up the costs of intermediation, 
it is questionable whether it has delivered better consumer outcomes.
As the NAPF and B&CE report reveals, many employers either do not understand 
the implications of these charges for their auto-enrolled employees, or are at 
best agnostic. In the very worst cases, we understand that a minority of employers 
have taken a commission rebate – in other words, they have benefited directly 
from the higher charge imposed on members (more recently we have seen 
examples where providers offer to pay 50% of the employer’s auto-enrolment 
contribution for the first three months). We were told that although in theory 
employers are discerning buyers, in practice ‘even some of the larger  employers 
are more concerned with the appearance of the scheme than with its substance’. 
Platforms
‘Platforms’ are a relatively recent innovation and emerged as another 
controversial feature of the research. 
A platform (confusingly, also known as a corporate wrap, corporate platform, 
benefits platform, benefits portal, and workplace savings platform, among other 
descriptions) is an IT interface between the member and the scheme, plus, in 
many cases, other employee benefits, including even bicycles. There are about 
12 DC pension platform providers, such as Aegon, Aviva, Axa, Fidelity, Legal & 
General, Scottish Widows, Standard Life, and Zurich. The FSA has reported that 
platform charging is opaque in relation to consultancy and platform provider 
costs.18   
While interviewees said that employers need an IT system to manage their 
pension and payroll functions under auto-enrolment, there was disagreement 
over the required level of member communications and modelling features, 
among others, that are incorporated into these systems. In practice, members of 
default funds are highly unlikely to use these features. Those concerned with the 
sell and buy sides paint quite different pictures:
Sophisticated employee education and engagement tools are a key part of many of the 
new platforms. Video, online tools and apps are making this new corporate platform 
the most visually interesting and potentially engaging of all platforms. PlatForum 19
18 www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps11_09.pdf 
19 The Corporate Platform Guide, Employee Benefits, November 2011
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Some employers – especially HR managers – get very excited about the visual impact 
of platforms. Has any independent research been carried out to establish how many 
employees actually use these facilities? Do they really help deliver better pensions to 
the majority of members in default funds?  Independent trustee 
Fund choice and the promotion of active selection 
Several interviewees said that, with the exception of schemes designed for 
executives who receive individual advice, there is probably no need for more 
than a total of five different risk-graded funds, including the default fund.  In 
practice, many schemes offer 50 funds with multiple managers for each asset 
class. We were made aware of preferential relationships between consultants, 
providers and asset managers that determine which funds appear on a platform. 
This would seem to represent a conflict of interests that serves the supply side of 
the market and not the customer.
Furthermore, interviewees expressed concern about schemes that regard a high 
level of active member investment choice as evidence of successful member 
engagement. 
I worked for a major insurer in the 1990s, when many large DC plans still had, 
as a metric of success, the number of people who didn’t use a default. I have always 
thought this drive to self-selection total cobblers – as a wise head of a US investment 
company put it, ‘We can’t all be our own CIO’. The problem is that some employers 
are still being encouraged to use this metric today. Consultant
In several schemes examined in the research, 50% of members made active 
investment choices, yet the membership profiles indicated very low levels of 
financial knowledge. It was suggested to us that this practice is not appropriate 
‘member engagement’; it encourages members to make potentially ill-informed 
decisions that they do not revisit and which can cost three or more times the 
charge of the default fund. 
Interviewees also said that individual risk-profiling tools, used to guide self-
selection, are no substitute for the professional investment governance of the 
default fund. The FSA has raised similar concerns.20
1.6 Regulatory bipolarity and opacity
The dual regulatory regime for DC is undoubtedly problematic, as the recent 
reports from FairPensions and the National Audit Office have observed.21  At 
present, tPR governs trust-based DC and the FSA regulates contract-based DC, 
although tPR’s high-level guidance applies to both. This gives rise to significant 
differences that are a cause for concern in relation to:
•	 The	ownership	of	assets	in	the	fund	and	how	these	can	be	transferred
•	 The	identification	of	the	fiduciary	responsible	for	member	outcomes,	and	
•	 The	lack	of	transparent	data	on	the	contract-based	market.	
20 www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/guidance_consultations/2011/11_01.shtml risk a customer is 
willing and able to take and making a suitable investment selection
21 FairPensions: fairpensions.org.uk/press/whoseduty 
NAO: www.nao.org.uk/publications/1213/defined_contribution_pensions.aspx
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Ownership of assets and transfers
Under a trust-based scheme, the contract is between the provider and the 
trustees. The trustees are legal owners of the assets and have the power to 
transfer them to a new scheme without having to seek the permission of all the 
members. Under a contract-based scheme, the provider is the owner of the 
assets and has a separate contract with each member. This means that when an 
employer changes its scheme to a lower-charging model, each member must 
sign a document to transfer existing assets to the new arrangement. Typically only 
15-20% of members do so. This is one of the main reasons why there are so 
many small pension pots trapped in high-charging funds.  
As a result of what appears to be a regulatory loophole, tPR’s involvement 
in overseeing contract-based schemes under auto-enrolment stops at the 
point a member leaves. This is because ‘once a member leaves employment, 
the contract becomes an individual personal pension with no employer 
involvement’.22 By contrast, under a trust-based scheme, the leaver is formally 
classified as a deferred member and therefore the trustees’ oversight must 
continue. As employees have no choice in whether they are auto-enrolled into a 
contract- or trust-based scheme, it seems that the dual regulatory system embeds 
significant differences in the treatment of active members and leavers, which can 
result in very different pension outcomes.  
Fiduciary responsibility for member outcomes in contract-based schemes
The second cause for concern relates to the thorny question of where the 
responsibility for the member outcome lies in contract-based schemes. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) – unintentionally – draws attention to 
this problem in its ‘Guidance for Offering a Default Option’, where it describes 
the way that responsibility in contract-based schemes is spread across a complex 
and potentially-conflicted range of entities:
The ongoing responsibility for the default option may vary between provider, advisor, 
fund manager, employer and governance committee in different situations and for 
different aspects of a scheme … For each stage [of the decision-making process: 
suitability for membership, design, charges, communication, monitoring, review], 
decision makers should consider who is accountable and assign responsibilities to the 
designated party as appropriate.23  
tPR and the FSA note the potential governance vacuum in contract-based 
schemes in their joint guidance, which says  that employers ‘may wish to put 
in place some form of ongoing monitoring on a voluntary basis’.24 However, 
management committees for contract-based DC schemes adhere to no formal 
structure, their role is unclear, they are not recognised in law and regulation, 
22 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/guidance/guidance-employer-engagement.aspx
23  www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/def-opt-guid.pdf
24 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/TPR-FSA-guide-on-regulation-of-contract-based-schemes.pdf
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and they have no formal powers. The regulators admit this point when they say 
‘a management committee generally has no legal definition and is a term used 
to cover a diverse and often not clearly defined group of arrangements set up 
by employers’.  While tPR recognises the importance of member trustee training 
through its trustee services and Trustee Toolkit, there is no equivalent system for 
contract-based DC committee members.
A better governance framework for auto-enrolment exists in theory for trust-
based schemes. We say ‘in theory’ because, although tPR  places responsibility 
for member outcomes on the trustees, interviewees said that many trustees fail in 
this duty of care due to lack of expertise and time. 
tPR has highlighted the low levels of trustee training and governance in smaller 
DC schemes.25 It says that many trustees do not understand DC risks and are 
unable to judge the member charge in terms of value for money.  Interviewees 
said that this issue also applies to larger schemes, where trustees might be 
preoccupied with managing the DB deficit. 
Poor data on the contract-based market
Interviewees said they were frustrated by the lack of clear data on the contract-
based DC market. They said that the FSA and ABI could help considerably 
with market analysis if contract-based data were categorised into workplace 
and ‘genuinely retail’, where the contract is bought by an individual via an 
independent advisor, for example. It was suggested that ‘workplace’ data should 
capture all contracts purchased through a workplace scheme. This would include 
deferred members – the contracts of leavers, for whom, at present, there is no 
audit trail to facilitate the scrutiny of the charges leavers pay.26
1.7 Caveat emptor or caveat venditor?
At present, about 80% of members use the default fund because they have no 
strong feelings about how best to invest their contributions. Therefore they rely 
on ‘experts’ to make the decision for them. Prior to auto-enrolment, the fund 
might not be labelled ‘default’, but it would still be where members’ contributions 
would be directed if they did not make an active choice.27  
As previously mentioned, under auto-enrolment, we expect the aggregate 
membership of default funds to be more than 90% of the total under auto-
enrolment. Most of the new members will be financially unsophisticated low-to-
median earners. Therefore they will be financially vulnerable.  At present, under 
the FSA’s ‘treating customers fairly’ regime for contract-based DC schemes, 
caveat emptor is assumed, which means that the customer should make every 
25 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/role-of-trustees-in-dc-schemes-statement-oct-2011.pdf  
26 The ABI data are only available to non-members who are prepared to pay an annual fee of 
almost £3,000. 
27 Some older schemes required members to choose between three funds risk-rated as low, medium 
and high. Inevitably most selected ‘medium risk’, and this is the fund we have used as the default in 
our quantitative modelling exercise in Section 2.
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effort to understand the product he or she purchases.28 
Member vulnerability is best understood from recognising the behavioural traits 
to which many individuals are subject: 
The inertia principle: The success of auto-enrolment, in terms of the target 
population covered, is predicated on member inertia. This is known as the 
‘inertia principle’ and, when it is operating, means that employees will ‘go with 
the flow’ and not resist an action – such as auto-enrolment – taken by their 
employer on their behalf. As the  FairPensions report, ‘Whose duty?’, said, 
‘harnessing inertia to increase pension saving is at the heart of public policy’. 
 The endorsement effect: The inertia principle is underpinned by an 
‘endorsement effect’, which tells us that employees assume their employer has 
made the right decision on their behalf. 
 Fear of regret: The endorsement effect is strengthened by a third principle: 
‘fear of regret’ which describes the well-established phenomenon that people 
are afraid of making a complicated choice because they worry they might get it 
wrong. So they stick with the default fund whether it is suitable for them or not. 
 Buying blind: Finally, in behavioural terms, there is an unquestionable difference 
between an individual (for example someone who is self-employed) who actively 
buys a personal pension from his or her advisor, and the employee who is 
passively auto-enrolled into the company pension scheme. The former can be 
identified in regulatory terms as an individual who is knowingly and voluntarily 
a ‘customer’, and who can be reasonably expected to consider the cost of the 
product he or she selects and purchases. Auto-enrolees will not knowingly and 
voluntarily purchase anything; they will accept on trust a product purchased for 
them by an employer or trustee, even though typically they bear all the costs. We 
call this ‘buying blind’.
 
A great deal of emphasis is placed by sellers of pension schemes – providers, 
consultants and advisors – on the provision of member education and 
information. While financial education in the workplace is to be welcomed, it 
will not change the fundamental flaws that embed member powerlessness and 
vulnerability in the purchasing process described above. 
The behavioural traits described above are crucial to the way funds should 
be designed for members of default funds. Accordingly, we suggest that the 
overarching principle for the default fund market under auto-enrolment should 
be ‘caveat venditor’: ‘let the seller beware’. Caveat venditor describes the 
legal presumption that a seller makes certain warranties, including the implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. Merchantability requires 
the seller to recognise that it is better suited than the buyer to determine whether 
a product will perform properly. Fitness for purpose requires the seller to 
recognise it possesses knowledge and expertise that is superior to the buyer’s 
and on which the buyer may reasonably rely. Caveat venditor, therefore, assumes 
the product will do what it says on the tin, which, in the case of an auto-
enrolment default fund, is to produce a lifetime income in retirement that is fair 
value relative to the contributions paid. 
28 www.fsa.gov.uk/doing/regulated/tcf 
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2 Quantitative Modelling Of The Default Funds’  
Investment Strategies And Charges
We investigated the after-charge investment performance of 8 categories of 
contract- and trust-based default funds sold between 1990 and 2012 and which 
are still in use. We measured performance outcomes in terms of the replacement 
ratio (RR) – the ratio of pension to final salary – that could be achieved by 
participating in each fund continuously for 40 years. We regard the RR as a far 
more meaningful performance measure than the fund size at retirement because 
it takes account  not only of investment costs and risks during the accumulation 
stage of a pension scheme,  but also of the cost of purchasing a lifetime 
inflation-linked annuity, which provides a guaranteed income for however long 
a scheme member lives.  Any differences in investment performance in the 
various default funds will be due to a combination of differing risk exposures in 
the underlying investment strategies of the default funds and the charges that the 
providers of the default funds extract.   
2.1 Assumptions made
We used the PensionMetrics (PM) model to conduct the analysis. Each year for 
40 years, we assume for a typical male employee, who joined a pension scheme 
at the age 25 with a starting salary of £25,500 (approximately equal to average 
UK earnings), that 8% (consisting of a 4% employee contribution, a 3% employer 
contribution, and 1% tax relief) of qualifying earnings (earnings in excess of a 
threshold initially set at £5,500)29 are put into one of the default funds. These 
contributions are then invested according to each default fund’s prescribed 
investment strategy and de-risking glide path. Charges are deducted annually 
from each accumulating fund value at the appropriate total expense ratio (TER) 
for that fund.30 At retirement, the whole fund is used to buy a real (inflation-
protected) annuity at the current annuity rate.31 
29 The threshold level of earnings for auto-enrolment were set at approximately £5,500 in 2012.  
This implies that in our example the first year’s contributions are equal to 8% of qualifying earnings 
of £20,000 (£25,500 - £5,500), i.e., £1,600. We assume that both earnings and the threshold 
are indexed. This means that the contribution rate is equivalent to 6.2745% of gross earnings (i.e., 
£1,600 ÷ £25,500) in the first year.
 
30 The TER generally includes the cost of advice and asset management charges (plus indirect costs 
such as custody, auditing, record keeping  and administration). It is still an incomplete measure of 
total costs, however, as it does not include the impact of trading costs on the fund and contract exit 
penalties. It is also important to note that the modelling assumes the employee stays in the same fund 
throughout the accumulation period. In practice this is unlikely because most employees change jobs 
several times during their career. The TER for short investment horizons can be much higher than 
for long investment horizons. Exit penalties on transfers and higher charges on ‘frozen’ pots, where 
contributions stop but the fund stays with the provider, will have a significant impact on the resulting 
pension.
31 We have assumed for modelling purposes that the full fund is used to buy an annuity to provide 
retirement income, even though every member has the right to use 25% of the fund to take a cash-
free lump sum and that many of the default fund’s de-risking glide paths assume that this right will be 
exercised (i.e., the glide paths end up with a fund which is invested 75% in bonds and 25% in cash). 
Our rankings are not sensitive to whether we assume that the whole or just 75% of the fund is 
annuitised. They are also not sensitive to whether the annuity is index-linked or not, although the 
starting amount of the annuity would be higher if a level annuity had been purchased instead of an 
index-linked annuity.
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The PM model used 5,000 Monte Carlo simulation trials per fund where each 
trial involved a different trajectory for asset returns over the 40-year investment 
horizon. One key measure of interest is the ‘mean RR’ which is the simple 
average RR across all the 5,000 simulations for any given investment strategy. In 
other words, this is the RR that the plan member can expect if he chooses a given 
default fund. We label this measure RRMean below. 
It is also important to examine downside risk exposure. The downside risk 
measure we chose is the ‘RR at the 5th percentile’ on the distribution of outcomes 
when all outcomes are ranked in order from worst to best. We label this measure 
RR5%. RR5% is the value of the RR of the 250th simulation (out of 5,000) in the 
sequence of simulations ranked from worst to best. This means that 5% of the 
simulations have a RR at or below RR5%, while 95% of the simulations have a 
RR above RR5%.  This, in turn, means that there is a 5% chance of getting a RR 
at or below RR5% and a 95% chance of getting a RR above RR5%.This is a pretty 
standard measure of downside risk exposure.  
2.2 The default fund spectrum
We consider eight different categories of default fund according to the vintage 
and type of fund. These demonstrate the development of DC in relation to asset 
allocation and charging structures since it first became popular as a workplace 
solution in the late-1980s/early-1990s. 
The eight fund categories are as follows:
1.  1990s Balanced Managed. These were the original default funds provided 
and managed by life offices in the 1990s. They would not have been labelled 
‘default’ funds in those days, as this term was not in use formally until the 
turn of the century, but they served exactly the same purpose – as the fund 
into which members’ contributions were directed if they did not make an 
active choice. The vast majority of these were contract-based, but there were 
also some small bundled trust-based funds.
2.  1995 Equities Only. 100% equity funds were offered from the mid-1990s as 
an alternative to balanced managed funds. 
3.  2005 Equities Only. Lower-cost 100% equity funds which were offered from 
the mid-2000s. 
4.  2000s Balanced Managed. These funds are typical of the slightly more 
diversified balanced managed model used by life offices from around the 
turn of the century to the late-2000s. Such funds tended to be managed 
entirely by life office provider, but some incorporated third-party asset 
management.
5.  2012 Balanced Managed. These funds are typical of the current life office 
offering, which is even more diversified than the previous model and more 
likely to incorporate third-party asset management components, as well as 
the provider’s own funds. 
6.  2012 Diversified Growth. Diversified growth funds are more diversified – for 
example through the more extensive use of alternative asset classes – than 
the typical life office balanced managed fund. 
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7.  2012 Consultant-Designed Funds. We include a number of examples of the new 
‘strategic blended’ funds designed by consultants for the trustees of larger schemes.
8.  2012 Trust-Based Multi-Employer Schemes. We include a number of 
examples of the funds used by modern schemes specifically designed for 
auto-enrolment, which can be accessed directly by employers, as well as 
introduced by advisors. 
The two key features that influence our results are the charges and asset allocations 
(including the de-risking glide path). We comment briefly on these features.
2.3 Charges
In Section 1, we described the complex charging structures that result in a TER 
of 3% or more for older funds: charges of up to 4% were encountered in the 
research. Modern funds have much lower explicit charges, but, in some cases, 
these disguise higher implicit charges, as the recent Lane Clark & Peacock report 
discovered: for example in the case of diversified growth funds, where the cost 
of sub-funds could add 50% to the headline rate.32 LCP’s report also noted the 
different charges that apply to the same funds, depending on the access route. 
For example, a large trust-based scheme that buys a fund direct from the asset 
manager might pay less than half the charge a stakeholder scheme pays for the 
same fund. In addition, the impact of advisor fees and commissions is significant, 
as these can double the member charge. 
A further issue that has a significant impact on the final pension is the impact 
of changing jobs. In our quantitative modelling, we assumed continuous 
membership of the same fund. In practice, most employees change jobs quite 
frequently and therefore will belong to several schemes. If a scheme uses a 
dual charging structure that favours long-stayers over short-term members, or 
if fund provider imposes an exit charges on transfers, clearly this will reduce the 
final pension. The same is true in the case of the common practice of increasing 
charges on funds where contributions cease, which continues today in the form 
of ‘deferred member charges’. In short, job changes tend to lead to lower DC 
pensions (other things equal) – just like they do with DB pensions – challenging 
the supposed full portability of DC pensions, a key reason for their introduction in 
the 1980s. In practice, the promise of full portability has proved to be a false one.
We ignored exit charges in our modelling, since we assume that the scheme 
member stays for his whole career in the same scheme. The TERs that we 
modelled ranged from 0.5% p.a. to 3% p.a.
2.4 Asset allocation and the de-risking glide path
An important feature of the modern consultant-designed and trust-based multi-
employer funds is the dynamic asset allocation process. Conventional life office 
models have a static asset allocation: it is fixed at the outset and does not 
change, except during the linear de-risking glide path in the five or so years prior 
to retirement (although de-risking was not common in the early days).
32 www.lcp.uk.com/news--publications/news/2012/pa/lack-of-clarity-on-dc-pension-fees-prevails-
as-additional-costs-increase-total-charges-by-as-much-as-50perc-says-new-lcp-report--1/
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Clearly, it is  too early to judge the success of these new dynamic asset allocation 
strategies, but the principle of investment risk management in DC schemes – the 
equivalent of liability-driven investing in defined benefit schemes – is a sound 
one. This because it enables those responsible for governance to act promptly 
to address issues such as a change in the economic or investment climate, or 
a change in taxation or legislation. In addition, dynamic asset allocation can 
respond more flexibly to changes in member behaviour, for example a trend 
towards later retirement.  
However, we need to distinguish between dynamic asset allocation strategies 
that are specifically designed to manage investment risks or respond to changes 
in member circumstances – and delivered through an agreed investment 
governance framework – and dynamic asset allocation strategies where the 
manager has full discretion. In the case of the former, there is a prescribed 
review process and the scope for potential adjustments to the asset allocation is 
limited; in the case of the latter, the asset allocation reflects the individual fund 
manager’s judgement.
Our study only covers the former type of dynamic asset allocation strategies. 
Where such strategies are used, we have been given confidential access to the 
specific asset allocation strategy that the fund provider believes will be typical for 
each year of the plan. We were not made privy to the actual adjustment rules 
that would operate during the life of the scheme in response to realised returns. 
Accordingly, we had to use the same supplied asset allocation strategy in each of 
the simulation trials.
Another important trend in DC investment has been a greater use of 
diversification to reduce volatility. This is reflected in an increasing use of so-
called ‘alternative’ asset classes, such as real estate, private equity, hedge funds, 
infrastructure and commodities. The funds that use these new asset classes are 
known as ‘diversified growth’ or ‘new balanced management’ funds. The new 
multi-employer default funds  also market themselves as being better diversified 
than the older funds.
De-risking glide paths work in different ways, but the objective is the same: to 
switch member funds gradually into low risk assets, such as bonds and cash. 
Glide paths were traditionally linear and deterministic, but some of the more 
recent providers’ glide paths – like the asset allocation strategy itself – are 
managed on a dynamic basis, so that de-risking takes place in the context of 
market movements. For schemes that target a specific annual return within 
a target date fund, this means that the glide path might start earlier or later 
depending on the realized performance of the fund in the preceding years.  
2.5 Key findings from the quantitative modelling
Practitioners, almost without exception, argue that the quality of asset 
management is more important than the cost. Our modelling results tell a very 
different story. 
Our first key finding is that there is a wide difference in RRMean across the different 
default funds. The worst performing fund was a 1990s balanced managed fund 
with a TER of 3%. This produced a RRMean of 14%. The best performing funds were 
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the new 2012 trust-based multi-employer schemes and the consultant-designed 
trust-based schemes for large employers when modelled using a TER of 0.5%. 
These produced a RRMean of almost double that of the worst performer.33 We 
found that the principal reason for the differences in RRMean across the various 
default funds that we examined is the differences in charges. The lowest charging 
funds are those associated with the trust-based multi-employer schemes and 
the consultant-designed trust-based schemes for large employers. The highest 
charging funds are those sold by life offices in the 1990s and early 2000s and 
still used as default funds under auto-enrolment.
Our second key finding is that there is a much wider distribution of outcomes in 
some default funds than others. This is reflected in the downside risk measure 
RR5%. The worst performing funds were the 1995 equities only funds with a RR5% 
of 6%. The best performing funds were again the new trust-based multi-employer 
schemes and consultant-designed schemes with a RR5% of approximately 
double the worst performing funds. Some of this difference will also be due to 
differences in asset allocation – some default funds take more risk than others in 
the expectation of generating higher returns – but some of the difference will be 
due again to charges. 
33 The RRMean would have been higher in all cases if the member had chosen a flat rate annuity 
rather than an inflation-linked annuity. It would have been lower if the member had decided to take 
some of the accumulated pension fund as a cash-free lump sum.
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3 Proposals For An Auto-Enrolment Kite Mark 
Never in a million years will pensions be a high priority for smaller employers. They 
should have had an automatic default – NEST – but the industry lobbied against 
this and won. From an imperfect start, the government and regulators now need to 
drive employers and all older scheme assets to new schemes that have a kite-mark for 
investment governance and charges. Independent trustee
Good governance has always been affordable and available to larger schemes, but it’s 
now available to all employers through multi-employer schemes. Unless we get smaller 
and medium-sized employers into these, they will be stuck with high-charging default 
funds and we will have a two-tier system that embeds member detriment. Consultant
3.1 The rationale for a kite mark
The commercial decision by consultants and advisors to avoid certain 
membership profiles leaves many smaller employers and their employees 
stranded. Unless these employers are given a very clear steer, those with existing 
schemes that have high charges are likely to continue to use them for auto-
enrolment, to the detriment of member outcomes.
Several interviewees favoured the concept of a kite mark for schemes suitable 
for the direct-to-employer market. This would involve a code of practice and 
central website for schemes that demonstrate compliance with tPR’s standards 
of investment governance and which have a TER capped at an agreed point 
or point range. We suggest that a TER of 0.5% (or even less) is a reasonable 
and achievable long-run target, but as we noted earlier in this report providers 
disagree how best to deliver low charges. Therefore consideration needs to be 
given to the relative merits of a simple single charge that applies to all members, 
irrespective of their period of membership, and a dual charging structure that 
favours the long-stayers over members who leave after just a few years. 
At present, there is no automatic default scheme for employers. The original intention 
was for NEST to undertake this role. NEST was introduced as a result of concerns 
about a potential market failure under auto-enrolment, because at the time existing 
providers said they would not serve the uneconomic sections of the market. 
Since then, several  providers have entered the market with schemes that they say 
are available to all employers, irrespective of the size and profile of the potential 
membership. The default funds of some of these schemes produced replacement 
ratios that were well above the average. 
3.2 Who will organise the kite mark?
A kite-marking system could be operated by an appropriate regulatory authority, 
but we understand that the government and regulators would be unwilling 
to undertake this role. Therefore we suggest that the kite mark requires the 
collaboration of appropriate industry organisations, such as  the NAPF,  the ABI 
and the IMA.  Nevertheless, we believe the government and regulators should 
drive the process.
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3.3 Role of the Kite Mark Board
1.  The proposed kite mark code would be developed by a governing board that 
includes a majority of members with no vested interests in the DC market. 
2.  The board would be responsible for screening applicants, issuing the kite 
mark and providing an annual ‘MOT’ to ensure record keeping, investment 
governance and charges remain on track. For these purposes, the board 
would adopt or develop appropriate processes, including quantitative 
modelling methodologies and software.  
3.  The board would develop a central website for kite-marked schemes that 
includes clear generic information for employers, a simple template for 
scheme information, and annual performance figures based on the TER, 
among other features. 
4.  The board would help to develop and promote an industry code of practice 
for fast-track transfers in. This feature would be promoted on the website.
3.4 The draft kite mark code
To qualify for the kite mark, we suggest schemes must meet the following 
requirements:
1. The ability and willingness to work directly with employers.
2. Charges:
  a.  A clearly stated and standard definition of the total expense ratio (or 
ongoing charge). The TER should include:
	 	 •	 	annual	management	charge	(AMC)	by	the	investment	manager
	 	 •	 	additional	fund	expenses	in	relation	to	specific	delegated	charges	not	
covered by the AMC (e.g., custodian fees; fund administration fees; 
accounting and auditing fees; valuation fees; distribution fees; legal 
and regulatory fees; directors’ and advisors’ fees)
	 	 •	 	all	costs	relating	to	scheme	administration	and	member	record	keeping,	
whether these be expressed as a monetary or a percentage figure. 
	 	 •	 	all	consultancy	charges,	where	these	are	incorporated	in	the	member	
charge.
   Any separate advisory fees invoiced by the consultant, but paid for by the 
employer/trustees rather than the member should be excluded from the 
TER calculation, because it is too difficult to assess whether the member 
is being impacted by these fees (for instance via a lower employer 
contribution rate).
 b.  The target charge – or range of acceptable charges – to be clearly set out. 
 c.  Agreement needs to be reached on the use of single and dual charging 
structures. Where dual charging structures are used, their impact must 
be shown over different investment horizons. 
 d.  The TER should be expressed in monetary terms per annum, as well as 
in percentage points, for an agreed range of typical member profiles, 
including those that pay the minimum contribution.
 e.  There should be no difference in the charges that apply to active and 
deferred members. 
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 f.  Charges should be disclosed to new members to show the impact on 
fund at the expected retirement date.
 g. Entry and exit charges should not be permitted.
3.  A simple format should be designed to enable providers to demonstrate their 
investment governance processes. 
4.  Projections  should be presented in a way that is meaningful to members, 
such as in the form of a projected real income in retirement or a replacement 
ratio, rather than in the form of a projected return on the fund or a projected 
fund size at retirement.  
5.  Alongside a projected performance measure, a downside risk measure 
should also be reported.  The kite mark might consider specifying an 
acceptable level of downside risk.
6.  An in-built selection and open market purchase system for members’ 
annuities.34 
7.  A facilitated transfer-in process negotiated by the industry to accommodate 
members’ previous schemes and plans. The exception to this requirement is 
NEST, which currently cannot accept transfers.
8.  A facilitated transfer process between kite-marked schemes where members 
change jobs but remain within the kite-mark market. As more employers 
use kite-marked schemes, this system will provide members with genuine 
portability – the original objective of personal pensions.
9.  Safe harbour status:35
  Kite-marked schemes should confer ‘safe-harbour’ status on employers, to 
denote that they have taken reasonable steps to reduce the considerable risks 
faced by members of DC schemes. By safe harbour, we mean that employers 
would not be responsible for member outcomes, as this responsibility would 
lie with the scheme.
  This type of provision exists in the US under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,36 whereby plan fiduciaries that comply with 
the qualifying default investment regulations are not liable for any loss that 
occurs as a result of such investments. 
34 Our views on this point were set out in ‘Treating DC members fairly in retirement?’ and have 
not changed.  We are pleased to see that even in the few months since the report was published, 
there have been further moves towards this more open model.  In addition, as our report noted, we 
believe such models can be adopted by all schemes at no additional expense to the employer and 
the employee.
35  In the UK, it is possible that employers might assume there is an implicit safe harbour provision 
for NEST, which is potentially dangerous as we understand that such a provision does not exist in 
practice. Although NEST is not a government scheme per se, it was designed and introduced by the 
government to ensure that all employers would be able to find an appropriate scheme even where 
they are not considered an attractive prospect to traditional providers.
36 www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/aos/ao2012-02a.html 
Caveat Venditor 34
4 Conclusion 
We hope that policymakers and regulators will consider carefully the findings 
and recommendations in this report, but we recognise that policy and regulatory 
reform takes time, particularly if this requires consultation with the powerful 
market players upon which the government depends for the delivery of auto-
enrolment.
But time is running out. The largest employers, which are required to introduce 
auto-enrolment in 2012 and early 2013, have already established their schemes. 
Due to their size and public profile, these schemes are likely to be well governed 
and have fair charges. The issues identified in this report apply mainly to the 
schemes already in use and likely to be used for auto-enrolment by smaller and 
medium-sized employers.
If a market fit for purpose for members of these schemes is considered a 
valuable objective, then we suggest that the industry might voluntarily focus on 
our proposed kite mark. An effective kite mark that is well promoted to smaller 
and medium-sized companies would help employers make effective choices 
going forward and also, through appropriate transfers of members’ assets from 
older funds, help to eliminate many of the poor practices relating to charges and 
investment governance encountered in our research.
However, history shows that the UK financial services industry does not readily 
reform itself. If it fails to respond to our most powerful finding – that high charges 
have a devastating impact on member outcomes – then auto-enrolment, the 
flagship innovation for private-sector pension provision, supported by all political 
parties in the UK, will be a failure. 
Fortunately, there is time to address the problem of high-charging funds being 
used for auto-enrolment purposes. We sincerely hope that the regulators and 
industry will work together to ensure this does not happen.
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RiskLab provides its services to renowned national and international institutional 
investors such as pension funds, corporate clients, family offices, wealth 
managers, and mutual funds.
Allianz GI is the investment arm of Allianz SE, a multi-national financial  
services company.
RiskLab cannot and does not guarantee the accuracy, validity, timeliness or 
completeness of any information, calculation, or data made available in the 
study presented.
We are extremely grateful to RiskLab for providing these data. 
Caveat Venditor 37
PensionMetrics:  
The Optimal Design of Defined Contribution Pension Plans
PensionMetrics is a software tool that can be used to design the best defined 
contribution pension plan for a plan member. For a given set of risk factors, 
a stochastic simulation model is used to determine the likely outcomes of the 
pension in retirement for different contribution rates, investment strategies and 
retirement ages. The model takes account of all relevant member characteristics 
including age, gender, occupation, prospective retirement age, other savings 
and investments, and longevity. The model can also take account factors relating 
to the plan member’s spouse such as age and occupation.
The key risk factors in the model are:
•	 	Salary	risk:	uncertain	future	salary,	which	affects	the	contributions	into	the	
pension fund. 
•	 	Investment	risks:	those	risks	associated	with	uncertain	investment	returns	in	
the pension fund.
•	 	Interest	rate	risk,	which	affects	both	investment	risks	and	the	annuity	rate	 
at retirement.
•	 	Inflation	risk.
•	 	Unemployment	risk.
•	 	Longevity	risk:	the	risk	of	an	uncertain	future	life	time.	
PensionMetrics has the following unique features:
•	 	Fully	integrates	the	accumulation	and	decumulation	phases	of	a	 
DC pension plan.
•	 	Recognises	the	importance	of	taking	account	of	the	member’s	occupation	
and gender.
•	 	Allows	for	a	wide	variety	of	accumulation	phase	or	investment	strategies.
•	 	Allows	for	a	wide	variety	of	decumulation	phase	or	post-retirement	
strategies. 
•	 	Allows	for	longevity	risk.
•	 	Uses	fan	charts	to	illustrate	the	range	of	possible	outcomes.
For more information, please contact David Blake on d.blake@city.ac.uk
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
•	 	to	undertake	high	quality	research	in	all	fields	related	to	pensions
•	 	to	communicate	the	results	of	that	research	to	the	academic	and	practitioner	
community
•	 	to	establish	an	international	network	of	pensions	researchers	from	a	variety	
of disciplines
•	 t	o	provide	expert	independent	advice	to	the	pensions	industry	and	
government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to 
offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field. The 
Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension funding and valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
Pension law and regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension accounting, taxation and administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g. corporate, 
public and international sectors).
Public policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy 
but the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. For more 
details, see: pensions-institute.org
Caveat Venditor 39
Previous Pension Institute Reports
‘Delivering DC? Barriers to participation in the company-sponsored pensions 
market’, by Debbie Harrison, Alistair Byrne, and David Blake, October 2004.
‘Pyrrhic Victory? The unintended consequences of the Pensions Act 2004’, by 
Debbie Harrison, Alistair Byrne, Bill Rhodes and David Blake, October 2005.
‘Annuities and Accessibility: How the industry can empower consumers to make 
rational choices’, by Debbie Harrison, Alistair Byrne and David Blake, March 
2006.
‘Dealing with the reluctant investor: Innovation and governance in DC pension 
investment’, by Alistair Byrne, Debbie Harrison and David Blake, April 2007.
 ‘An unreal number: How company pension accounting fosters an illusion of 
certainty’, by David Blake, Zaki Khorasanee, John Pickles and David Tyrrall, 
January 2008.
‘And death shall have no dominion: Life settlements and the ethics of profiting 
from mortality’, by David Blake and Debbie Harrison, July 2008.
‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: What are the consequences?’, by David Blake, 
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks, July 2010.
‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: Quantifying the consequences?’,  
by David Blake, Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks, September 2010.
PYRRHIC VICTORY?
The unintended consequences of the Pensions Act 2004
A Pensions Institute report for employers, 
trustees, advisers and policymakers 
Debbie Harrison 
Alistair Byrne 
Bill Rhodes
David Blake
“There is no point in having the best regulation in the world,
if there are no schemes left to regulate”
     
ANNUITIES & ACCESSIBILILITY
How the industry can empower 
consumers to make rational choices
A Pensions Institute report for insurance companies, financial advisers, 
employers, trustees, consumer bodies and policymakers
Debbie Harrison 
Alistair Byrne 
David Blake
March 2006
DELIVERING DC?
Barriers to participation 
in the company-sponsored pensions market 
A Pensions Institute report for Pension Practitioners, 
Employers, and Policymakers
Debbie Harrison 
Alistair Byrne 
David Blake
October 2004
      
Dealing with the  
reluctant investor
innovation and governance in Dc pension investment 
A Pensions Institute report for policymakers,  
employers, trustees, insurance companies, asset managers,  
consultants and financial advisers 
Alistair Byrne
Debbie Harrison
David Blake
April 2007
AN UNREAL NUMBER
How company pension accounting fosters an illusion  
of certainty
A Pensions Institute report for accounting standard setters, 
policymakers, employers and trustees 
David Blake
Zaki Khorasanee
John Pickles
David Tyrrall
January 2008
This research was funded by the ICAEW’s charitable trusts
AND DEATH SHALL 
HAVE NO DOMINION
Life settlements and the ethics of profiting from mortality
A Pensions Institute Report for Buyers and Sellers of Life 
Settlements, Financial Advisors, Regulators and Policymakers
David Blake and Debbie Harrison
July 2008
ENDING COMPULSORY 
ANNUITISATION
What are the consequences?
A Pensions Institute report for policymakers, financial advisers, 
and pension scheme members 
David Blake
Edmund Cannon
Ian Tonks
July 2010
